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Except FOR THE fact that DOgen (1200-1253) and KyOgoku Tame­
kane (1254-1332) inhabited the same land and almost the same time­
frame, they otherwise seem to have lived in different worlds. The 
former, although of aristocratic origins, spent most of his life in Zen 
monasteries and, at least during his final decade, geographically very 
far from the centers of power. Largely by having their value re­
discovered in our own century, DOgen’s prose writings show that he 
was one of Japan's preeminent thinkers and, quite likely, was one of 
the most original and powerful philosophers to appear within Asian 
history. Almost incidental to that opus in prose, a slim body of poetry 
was also composed by Ddgen—64 poems in all in the classical 31- 
syllable form known as waka. Partially because they are so few, these 
poems to-date have received scant attention.1
1 The books chiefly under review here are Steven Heine, A Blade of Grass: Japanese 
Poetry and Aesthetics in Dogen Zen (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1989, 
xiii+171 pp.) and Robert N. Huey, KyOgoku Tamekane: Poetry and Politics in Late 
Kamakura Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, xii + 228 pp.)
Tamekane, by contrast, hobnobbed with emperors, at times held con­
siderable power, but twice lost it and was dispatched into political ex­
ile. His claim to fame, however, is not what he did in the world of 
politics but in that of poetry. Some Japanese critics today regard him 
as one of that land’s most important poets, even though still 
understudied.2 Tamekane was prolific and in his own diary boasted of 
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having written 10,000 waka, more than any other person at any time in 
history. Although only a fraction of that vast number, at least 827 sur­
vive—itself a considerable opus.3
2 My own appreciation for Tamekane owes much to personal conversation with Pro­
fessor Kit ay am a Masamichi, whose “Uta no KyQkyoku: KyOgoku Tamekane” (Riso 
no. 494, July 1974, pp. 27-40) has been especially helpful to me. I began this essay 
while enjoying the research facilities of the Kokubungaku KenkyU ShiryOkan during 
1990. I here express my thanks to its director, Professor Koyama Hiroshi, and among 
its staff especially Professors Matsuno YOichi and Komine Kazuaki for their insights 
and great help.
’ This compilation is by Iwasa Miyoko in her Kyogokuha Waka no KenkyQ 
(Kasama Shoin, 1987). Huey himself compiled 720; see his book, Appendix C, pp. 
168-9.
Tamekane’s interest in Buddhism, however, was deep. Thus, to 
bring him and DOgen together for consideration in this essay is not nearly 
as gratuitous as it may at first seem. The specific foci of my concern 
here, however,will be on the Buddhism and the role of power in the 
poetry of these two medieval figures. This means that, of necessity, I 
will pass without comment over many other things in the two fine 
books under review.
What I find fascinating is that, although for very different reasons, 
there is in both DOgen and Tamekane what would appear to be an odd, 
perhaps even flawed, integration between the poetry and other parts of 
life. Dogen’s disparity would appear to be one between the existence of 
his sixty-three waka and his explicit warnings in prose to his disciples 
concerning the risk to their Buddhist practice posed by any indulging in 
the literary arts. The disjunction in Tamekane’s case is one between his 
intense, often turbulent, political life and the body of his poetry, in 
which virtually no trace of that turmoil can be found. That is, DOgen’s 
split looks like one between his preachments and his practice, whereas 
that of Tamekane is due to the fact that his literary and his political 
lives seem to lie next to one another without coming into discernible 
contact.
Heine’s book on DOgen addresses precisely this problem and does so 
in a sustained and fairly successful fashion. He writes:
In a cultural tradition which has been marked by a profound 
and direct convergence of religion and aesthetics, DOgen 2
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seems to stand out for his strong criticisms of literature. He 
warns his followers against involvement in literary pursuits by 
advising a single-minded dedication to sustained zazen prac­
tice to achieve the Buddhist Dharma, [p. 4]
Given his warnings about the risks involved in writing verse, we natural­
ly are puzzled by the collection of poems he himself wrote. The fact 
that they are few in number does not solve the mystery since, if Ddgen 
were attempting to be consistent, they should not exist at all.
A Blade of Grass deals with this conundrum from a variety of angles 
and with a battery of interesting materials—so many, in fact, that they 
cannot be summarized here. If I were to choose where Heine seems 
most effective, it would be in those places where DOgen can be shown 
to be distancing himself in a very strong way from what had become, at 
least in certain parts of the Ch’an/Zen tradition, a posture of an­
tipathy towards verbalized expression. Implicitly agreeing in this with a 
position that has been well argued by Hee-Jin Kim,3 4 Heine summarizes 
DOgen’s view as follows:
4 See his “The Reason of Words and Letters: DOgen and Koan Language,** in 
William R. LaFleur, ed., DOgen Studies (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985, 
pp. 54-82.
3 The understanding of this point in the West is largely due to the influence of Pro­
fessor Masao Abe. See now also Joan Stambaugh’s Impermanence is Buddha-nature:
DOgen’s Understanding of Temporality (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990).
Discourse is itself a full and concrete manifestation of the 
reality of impermanence and the unity of man and nature. 
Words attain their meaning in the same way flowers realize 
their beauty—because of their frailty and evanescence, [p. 171
This fits in with what is clear about DOgen’s insistence on a truly 
radical interpretation of impermance and his rejection of all forms of 
eternalism and essentialism, especially the types that slip in when we 
have our guard down.5 This, I think, is why the sentences and prose 
paragraphs of the ShObOgertzd often read like verbal mercury—some­
thing that flees precisely when you think you have it captured between 
your fingers. This is not an incidental feature of DOgen’s language but 
something he intentionally forged in order to make his words match 
the modality of his understanding of total impermanence.
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Heine, however, lets some instances of what I would call nasty little 
“etemalogems” sneak into his own narrative, especially when writing 
of the “psyche of the Japanese” [p. 13], the “Japanese genius” [p. 12], 
and what he takes to be the Japanese language’s built-in immediacy, a 
feature which automatically helps it “eliminate any gap between reflec­
tion and fully engaged experience” [p. 4]. Although in this he is pick­
ing up on hypotheses and suggestions from a variety of Japanese 
scholars who have written on these topics in the past, in my view Heine 
is not sufficiently critical of these theories. Moreover, he does not ask 
whether they are compatible with Ddgen’s sense of impermanence. In 
statements such as the following, he not only strains the evidence but 
also lays his work open to attack from persons suspicious of how an 
“ideology of Japaneseness” might have gotten implanted in modern 
studies of DOgen:
DOgen is unique precisely because he is typically Japanese and 
has heightened and refined the traditional Japanese outlook, 
[p. 12]
DOgen, to my knowledge, expressed no interest whatsoever in “Japa­
neseness” and spent his whole life honing and articulating an insight 
that he claimed had initially come to him while in China. Where, then, 
does the reification of “Japaneseness” in Dogen come from?
1 suspect it came in as part of the rhetoric used in the 20th century to 
“liberate” DOgen from being confined to traditional interpretations 
offered within the school he founded. That is, although in 1924 Watsu- 
ji Tetsurd wrote publicly about the need to free this 13th century figure 
from the sectarian embrace of the Soto school and to recognize his 
potential as a philosopher with universal import, soon enough Dogen 
was again confined. This time the entrapment was within a rhetoric 
about Japan, about inherent characteristics of the Japanese language, 
and about a native “tradition” taken to be a uniform unfolding of 
something essential inasmuch as it is rooted primordially in the 
language itself. Watsuji himself contributed to this hermeneutic of 
Japaneseness. But this too is now an interpretative limitation from 
which the strong writings of DOgen ought to be disencumbered— 
perhaps especially by readers outside of Japan. In his writings on 
DOgen, Heine has shown a mastery of many of the 20th century Jap­
anese discussions of this figure, but I am suggesting here the need for 
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more rigorous probing of some of the ideological suppositions therein. 
And is this not, after all, something implied by DOgen’s rigorous 
rejection of all essentialism and etemalism?
What I wish to praise about Heine’s book is the fact that it has open­
ed up a discussion of what there is in Ddgen of relevance to questions 
of aesthetics. Although I am not certain that Ddgen intended to con­
struct what philosophers in the West have often called “an aesthetic,” 
it is clear that his sensitivity to language, to literary form, and even to 
the visual arts gave him occasion to refer to these things in sometimes 
strikingly original ways. A Blade of Grass has launched this enterprise 
and others should join Heine in continuing it. (An important item, not 
to my knowledge dealt with by Heine, is the rich essay “Gabyd” [iff] 
or “Painted Rice-cakes” in the ShObOgenzO.6) The results of further 
studies might be quite surprising since DOgen in his own way is, after 
all, a wily fox.
6 As, for instance, in Terada TOru and Mizuno Yaoko, DOgen (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1970), vol. 1, pp. 283-288, and in English in Kazuaki Tanahashi, ed., Moon in 
a Dewdrop: Writings of Zen Master DOgen (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1985), 
pp. 134-139.
Is that perhaps why he gave us the conundrum of his poetic practices 
out of accord with his own injunctions against taking the risks of versi­
fying? Would he allow us to feel comfortable in reconstructing his 
“aesthetic” as a way of bridging these incompatibles? These questions 
would have to be raised.
We need have much less trouble finding reasons to praise certain of 
DOgen’s verses and the way Heine has translated them. Take, for in­
stance, the profundity and beauty of the following:
Natsu fuyu no 
Omoi ni wakanu 
Koshi no yama 
Furu shirayuki mo 
Naru ikazuchi mo
Summer, winter,
Both inexpressible:
Across the Echizen mountains 
White snowflakes falling, 
Thunder crackling, [p. Ill]
It is, I suspect, not incidental that within the verses of this philosopher 
of radical impermanence, those that stand out are the ones wherein he 
has captured that teaching with a striking image. That surely happens 
in the following:
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Yama no ha no 
Honomeku yoi no 
Tsukikage ni 
Hikari mo usuku 
Tobu hotaru kana.
A firefly’s
Soft glimmer,
As the mountain ridge
Faintly appears under the
Dim glow of the moon. [p. 123]
Chinese Zen phrases had it that even the mountains walked, but in 
keeping with the Japanese waka tradition of modulated perceptions 
rather than surreal images, DOgen gets the mountain—like the firefly 
and the glimmering moon—to slip almost imperceptibly but still percep­
tibly , away.
Poems such as these fit right in with what we know (or want to think) 
of DOgen as both consistent and “realized.” But there are others, 
verses in which it is quite possible to see evidence of pain and even con­
fusion in the life of the poet. In one of these DOgen envisions his own 
parents—persons whose deaths left him an orphan at an early age—as 
wanderers, along with himself, in the samsaric condition known in 
medieval Japan as the “six paths’ or “six realms:”
Mutsu no michi 
Ochikochi mayoi
Tomogara wa
Waga chichi zo kashi 
Waga haha zo kashi
My companions
Trekking
The six realms— 
I recognize my father!
There is my mother! [p. 108]
Heine, rightly I think, takes this as a lament [p. 82]. Theoretically at 
least, by turning this into an evocation of the bodhisattva’s vow to 
rescue sufferers in the six realms, one hypothetically could move the 
sense and maybe even the sentiment of the poem in a positive or 
affirmative direction.
However, although bodhisattvas might somehow “enjoy” getting 
reborn into the dark realms of suffering, there is no hint from DOgen 
that his parents were such—or that he himself knew anything other 
than suffering in his own recognition of their protracted pain. The 
verse, in a word, is not one we easily can or should associate with the 
poetry of “enlightenment.” It is a dark poem. DOgen, who pictures 
himself along with his parents in the middle of despair and “delusion” 
[mayoi], lets us see himself in a moment when he scarcely seems to be 
the usual highly realized person we see in his prose.
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I find something problematic too in the following poem and in the 
way it is rendered by Heine. It comes with a headnote:
Fubo shoshO no manako
Tazune iru
Miyama no oku no
Sato nareba
Moto sumi nareshi 
Miyako nari keri
True Seeing Received at Birth
Seeing the Way
Amid the deepest mountains paths 
The retreat I find
None other than
My original abode: satori! [p. 95]
There may be far better poems than this one in the opus, but I choose it 
to explore just how problematic things can be. Heine has inserted a 
“satori” into the English without there being any precise equivalent in 
the original. (He reads the word sato (“former home” or “native 
village”] as implying satori (“sudden awakening”] by virtue of its be­
ing, as it were, two-thirds of the way there in terms of its syllables. (See 
page 32.) However, by making this the linguistic telos of the forward­
thrust of the entire poem, the sense of the poem gets straight-jacketed: 
“Satori” gets to be what the poem is all about—unambiguously so.
A fairly flat, but literal and parsimonious translation of the poem 
might go something like this:
With the Very Same Eyes with Which We’re Born
Searching into
the mountains’ deepest 
places, I’ve clearly located 
my old home—the capital 
where I long ago lived!
Although I am not an advocate of the literal and terse at all times when 
translating waka, this happens, I think, to be a place where the “inter­
pretative” translation offered by Heine goes too far. I have a minor 
problem with the “satori” not found in the original but a fairly major 
one with Heine’s omission of reference to a “capital” [miyako] that 
figures largely in DOgen’s original.
Heine, I must note, has an extended discussion of this verse and in it 
sees a complex set of doubled significations. He reads the “headnote” 
[fubo shoshO no manako which is lifted from the 19th
chapter of the Lotus Sutra. In a way that pretty much guarantees that 
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he will be able to take the entire poem as an allegory of the “awaken­
ing” event in Zen. Virtually every word of the poem has, when so 
translated, something other than its ordinary signification. The result 
is that in the English version primordial enlightenment itself gets 
forefronted. Consequently, the reference to the “capital” is dispensed 
with altogether.
What is the alternative to such a heavily allegorized reading?
It is, I suggest, to take the reference to a capital as anything but 
negligible. And since this poem seems to derive from the final decade of 
DOgen’s life—that is, the period when he had moved to Echizen and in 
1244 founded the temple Eiheiji (initially called Daibutsuji) in a moun­
tainous area very far from Kyoto—this verse seems to be saying 
something about the degree of satisfaction or accommodation the poet 
found in that far-off location. Although to most people the “capital” 
meant Kyoto [Heian] with its splendour, wealth, and power, DOgen 
in this interesting poem declares his own “capital” to be in the 
remoteness of Echizen province.
The literal capital, we must remember, was not unimportant to 
DOgen. In fact, what shows up in this poem is, I want to suggest, con­
nected to one of the nastiest problems in DOgen scholarship, namely 
his attitude to events in the capital. There is no need or place here for 
details of the debate. Suffice it to note that, especially in research car­
ried out by Furuta ShOkin, the matter of the reasons for DOgen’s rather 
abrupt departure from KOshOji on the outskirts of the capital to settle 
in remote Echizen have been deeply problematized. Furuta and others 
hold, in brief, that it was because DOgen had lost out in the capital­
centered game of ecclesiastical politics that he opted for a move to the 
geographical periphery in 1243. Echizen was a place to recoup his 
losses after having been politically bested by the monks of Mt. Hiei and 
some of those associated with the ascendant wave of Rinzai Zen.7
7 The sources in Japanese by Furuta and others as well as the arguments on this ques­
tion are available in Carl Bielefeldt, “Recarving the Dragon: History and Dogma in the 
Study of DOgen,** in DOgen Studies, pp. 40 ff. and in Bielefeldt*s DOgen’s Manuals of 
Zen Meditation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 43ff.
If there is even a modicum of truth in this revisionist scholarship on 
DOgen, it cannot but be important for our grasp of the poem under con­
sideration. If, as seems very likely, DOgen’s move from Heian to 
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Echizen was less than a totally happy one, the verse about having 
located a personal “capital” in the midst of far-off mountains is bitter­
sweet. There strikes me as an element of rhetorical straining in this 
verse. I cannot escape the sense that in these lines DOgen is either trying 
to convince his fellows (and even himself?) that their mountain loca­
tion will do or, alternatively, is expressing what he has come to accept 
as a necessity to which he now is reconciled. In either case there is 
testimony to a state of affairs—either present or in the past—in which 
there is or was unhappiness over the “loss” of life in the capital and all 
opportunities such provided for patronage and the forward movement 
of Zen as understood, taught, and institutionally structured by DOgen 
himself.
This poem, in fact, may tell us a good deal about why Ddgen advised 
his followers to avoid writing poetry. He knew by his own experience 
that there are risks in writing waka—especially if, as seems the case 
here, such poems were closely tied to events in one’s life and the emo­
tions such events engender.8 One of the things that had gotten to be con­
ventional in Japan’s world of literature was the taking of waka as a 
medium in which expressions of weakness and vulnerability were far 
more welcome than those of strength. Lachrymosity and delusion 
mayoi ) were acceptable; conversely, too much evidence of 
enlightenment was not. Awareness of impermanence (mujO &#), when 
expressed in waka, was supposed to engender sadness—that is, 
something far different from what is taught in DOgen’s temple talks 
and prose writings.
• Although a minor poet, Dogen appears to have shared with SaigyO (1118-1190), a 
major poet but also a Buddhist monk, an eagerness to connect his writing to his own ex­
perience. In that sense they both took partial exception to the regnant convention ac­
cording to which it was expected that there be “aesthetic distance” between life and 
verse.
Ddgen may, with only partial success it seems, have been one of the 
few who struggled against the pressures of this as a convention in 
waka. (Most Buddhists in medieval Japan simply used verse in 
Chinese, kanshi, as a literary form through which to express and prac­
tice their realizations. This, I think, was simply because kanshi did not 
have what had become waka’s built-in resistance to such things. 
Because of these conventions, ironic as it seems, it was far easier for 
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Japanese Buddhists to write “enlightened” verse in Chinese than in 
Japanese.)
If waka was widely understood to be the context in which one should 
express weakness and delusion rather than strength and clarity, it 
should come as no surprise that DOgen told his adherents to practise 
their Buddhism in another medium. At the same time it also, seems 
quite natural that he himself would have tried—at least in the few waka 
he composed—to do something against the convention in this matter.
My impression is that he was only partially successful. He wrote too 
few waka to revolutionize the form. Moreover, I think he at times let 
himself be pulled into waka’s readiness to offer its own form to persons 
experiencing sadness, resentments, and weakness. This is why it 
became the natural place for him to lament what he saw as the fate of 
his dead parents. This too is why it is in waka that we find the bitter­
sweet expression about having repositioned his own “capital” in the 
remoteness of Echizen’s mountains. Waka was a world in which one 
could let pain be pain. It also allowed illusion to be illusion and am­
biguity to be ambiguity.
Heine steps away from this part of the evidence and this part of the 
man—-largely, I think, through theory. For him even Ddgen’s am­
bivalence is not real. He writes:
. . . DOgen’s ambivalence does not reflect uncertainty and 
confusion about whether he wishes to turn to literature or 
Buddhism, aesthetics or religion, Kyoto or Echizen, and emo­
tions or detachment to find fulfillment. Rather, the ambiv­
alence discloses the fundamental paradoxicality of absolute 
and relative which encompasses the unity and distinction of 
apparent opposites, [p. 35]
Perhaps.
My own sense, though, is that appreciation here slips into adulation. 
By comparison, I am suggesting that a solid but open-eyed apprecia­
tion of DOgen’s accomplishments goes farther when seen in conjunc­
tion with what appear to be his ongoing struggles, not as the smooth 
unrolling of an unruffled life and glitch-free philosophy.
Kydgoku Tamekane, as noted earlier, was very different. Over the 
past couple of decades Japanese scholarship has progressively built a 
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case for seeing him as one of the major figures in the history of 
Japanese verse. Because it provides a fine introduction in English to 
such an important poet, Robert N. Huey’s book is a valuable contribu­
tion. In if we are given a well-documented account of Tamekane’s tur­
bulent life and competent translations of a sixty-poem sequence, the 
“Kingyoku Uta-awase.”
It always is an act of minor violence to lift a poem out of such a se­
quence, but I do so to give a sense of a couple of those I find especially 
well done. In the summer sequence number fourteen is:
Kawa mukai 
Yanagi no atari 
Mizu miete 
Suzushiki kage ni 
Sagi asobu nari
Water seen
Around willow trees 
That line the river, 
And herons sport
In the cooling shade, [p. 172]
And in the “miscellaneous” grouping number fifty-two is rendered:
Tabi no sora
Ame no furu hi wa 
Kurenu ka to 
Omoite nochi mo 
Yuku zo hisashiki
This rainy day of travel, 
The sky so dark I wonder 
If already the sun has set 
But then I continue on
For I still have far to go. [p. 177]
There is beauty in the original and a sure skill in most of the transla­
tions.
In its opening pages Huey’s book makes bold claims. Perhaps this 
should be expected in a volume subtitled “Poetry and Politics in 
Kamakura Japan.” To announce that you have chosen such a theme is 
at the same time to appear to be, at least in the West’s study of the 
Japanese waka, turning over new critical turf. Huey writes:
This book will not be simply an exercise in literary criticism. 
Certainly Tamekane’s poetry will be explored in some detail 
from that standpoint. But another important line of inquiry 
will be the extent to which the complicated political and social 
issues of the time affected Tamekane’s ability to write and 
publish his poetry and conditioned his influence on his own 
age as well as the reputation he carried in later times, [p. 4]
One phrase needs emphasis since Huey has weighed his words very 
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carefully here; his interest is in how political and social issues affected 
Tamekane’s ability to write and publish. Questions of the impact of 
these things on either content or the ideological matrixing of Tame­
kane’s verse are not to be considered. The key question becomes: Was 
all the turbulence and nastiness of his political life worthwhile? Was 
there a net plus in and through it all—one that is demonstrable in the 
quality and quantity of his verse?
The surprising thing is that in the final analysis Huey does not really 
answer this, the very question he himself poses as having crucial impor­
tance. Tamekane’s losses were not negligible; disgrace and exile during 
the last twelve years of his life meant, for instance, that virtually 
nothing of his from that period survives. On the other hand, Huey 
notes that if Tamekane had not gotten involved in politics, “he would 
probably not have been commissioned to do an imperial anthology.” 
(p. 150) But the final estimate is hard to make and Huey’s last 
paragraph is one in which he admits to bewilderment.
We can never know whether Tamekane exhausted his polit­
ical capital in devoted service to his imperial patrons, or 
whether he did so realizing it was the only way his poetry 
would survive the ages. In any case in contrast to Tameyo, 
who was an adequate, if uninspired poet, and a fairly suc­
cessful politician, Tamekane is memorable because he took 
risks, in both poetry and politics. From our standpoint, his 
successes in the literary field provide more than adequate 
justification for his political failures, [p. 150]
To call it a willingness to take risks, however, is to put a nice face on it; 
what, in fact, comes through the interesting details of Huey’s narrative 
is that more often than not Tamekane made trouble for himself 
through his own pettiness and arrogance. He played a rough political 
game with lawsuits, sycophancy, and dirty tricks. And it appears that 
he was not terribly successful at it.
But there is one risk Tamekane never took. He seems not to have 
brought anything of his roller-coaster political life into the content of 
his verse. In this he stuck fast to the convention of court poetry. Huey 
notes that “. . . merely by reading Tamekane’s waka one would get 
almost no sense at all of how tumultuous his life was.” (p. 4) This is 
worth noting because it is the rationale for Huey to treat Tamekane 
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the politician and Tamekane the poet as virtually unconnected. The 
biography is graphically and accurately narrated and the technical 
mechanics of the poetry are skillfully described. But there is very little 
intellectual curiosity about the copula in the subtitle’s reference to 
“poetry and politics.’* In spite of its strong claims about doing more, 
ultimately Huey’s explanation goes no farther than that provided thirty 
years ago in Robert Brower and Earl Miner’s Japanese Court Poetry— 
to wit; that waka is as close as we can get to “pure lyricism” and within 
the court was kept from verging off into extraneous topics by its tradi­
tions and conventions, (p. 2)
Explanation—at least today—cannot stop by reference to conven­
tions. Now it is surely the reasons for the conventions themselves that 
need close examination. And it has been, 1 suspect, the stubborn 
refusal by Western scholars to open up the problem at this level that 
has made most studies of waka, at least in terms of their methodology, 
to be not only frozen in time but intellectually dull as well. Exceptions 
exist but too often Anglo-American waka studies have been little more 
than further uses of the approach of Japanese Court Poetry, however 
pace-setting in its own time. This means there has been almost no real 
movement in this discipline for thirty years.
What needs asking are questions about the reasons for the limits plac­
ed on the usable range of diction, the tight constriction of topics, the 
socio-political function of the historical sequence of imperial an­
thologies, the creation of a climate wherein poets attempted innovation 
only at the risk of not being anthologized, the nearly complete absence 
of reference to civil strife or war, and the taboo against letting mention 
of commoners and their lives into what one dared write about in 
waka.9
9 SaigyO was an exception, writing waka about fisherfolk met on his pilgrimages and 
about the toll of deaths caused by internal warfare. See my Mirror for the Moon: A 
Selection of Poems by SaigyO (1118-1190) (New York: New Directions, 1978)
10 A ground-breaking study of this, one dealing principally with prose, is Michele 
Marra’s The Aesthetics of Discontent: Politics and Reclusion in Medieval Japanese 
Literature (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991). Waka is the subject of the 
final chapter in HyddO Hiromi, Oken to Monogatari (Tokyo: SeikyOsha, 1989).
I am suggesting, of course, that there needs to be more attention to 
the nexus between waka and ideology.10 Surely “conventions” are 
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social and contingent constructions, not natural and necessary phe­
nomena. With roots that go back to Feuerbach’s analysis of religion, 
a sensitivity to the ideological component in texts involves asking 
whether things may in fact be the opposite of what we are being led to 
believe. It turns some questions inside-out. For instance, Huey’s bland 
claim is: “if it were not for [Tamekane’s] tenacity as a politician we 
might never have had a chance to read his waka at all—history might 
have swallowed it up.” (p. 4) But since it is clear that Tamekane 
adhered closely to the taboos by not letting anything of his own stormy 
career impact upon his verse, does it not seem that he shied away from 
taking literary risks that would have been real ones?
Huey’s proposition needs to be inverted. It is not that Tamekane 
fought dirty in the world of politics so that he could keep his poetry 
pure but, on the contrary, that he kept his poetry pure so that he could 
use even that purity for credentials and leverage in the dirty world of 
political power. Moreover, it is important to note that for those whose 
critique of ideology is given an additional Marxian thrust, it would 
appear that the “lyrical purity” of the whole waka tradition is itself 
nothing other than a ruse by which the court class, having appropriated 
to itself both wealth and leisure, publicly tried to launder out the 
seaminess of court life and disguise the realities of power.
I find merit in Richard Rorty’s view that “the ‘critique of ideology’ 
is an occasionally useful tactical weapon in social struggles, but as one 
among many others. ”111 think it difficult to deny that, whatever else it 
did, waka also played a socio-political role in Japanese history: its 
“purity” was designed not for the sake of the poetry alone. Such 
literary art came to be harnessed into playing a role in the strategies 
of legitimation. Here too there is a link with what was noted earlier con­
cerning DOgen and the need to see him as other than an instance of 
something reified as the Japanese aesthetic.
11 Richard Rorty, “De Man and the American Cultural Left,** in His Essays on 
Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, 1991) p. 135.
This does not mean that the critique of ideology can be the whole of 
literary studies. Nor is it to be assumed that the Marxian-Althusserian 
approach is the only or the best way of carrying it out.12 While it is 
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clear that serious attention to ideological factors is already overdue in 
many of our studies, there is an important question to be asked as to 
whether or not a critique of ideology exhausts the significance and 
value of literature.
1 find merit in the argument that it does not. While allowing such a 
critique to throw light where it can, we do well to avoid being so daz­
zled by it that we no longer can see a literary text as anything other than a 
social or political code that has found an ingenious way of disguising 
itself. We may not ignore the deceptions written into the texts we read. 
Yet at the same time history, man, and literature are each too complex 
to allow us to feel satisfied with methodologies so defined that they re­
quire a reduction of that complexity to one or more of its component 
parts. To want to get a clear view of those places where literature gets 
enmeshed with politics is not to adopt the theory that literature is really 
only politics in a dissembling mode.
We can illustrate this point by again considering Huey’s study of 
Tamekane. A very important paragraph is the following:
Scholars agree that one of the consistent characteristics of 
Kydgoku poetry in general and of Tamekane’s work in par­
ticular, is that nature, or human behavior, is captured therein 
at its moment of trans-formation from one state to another. It 
is somewhat misleading to call this sort of thing “technique.” 
It is an artistic stance, and more than that, a way of looking 
at the world. To attempt through art to capture nature or 
human consciousness at that single moment when it is chang­
ing from one state to another is to imply that there is sig­
nificance in the moment, and that there is significance in the 
movement from one moment to another. This is basic Bud­
dhist doctrine, [pp. 73-74]
This is a fine statement. After such an impressive start, however, it is as 
if Huey looks back over his shoulder and remembers the stance of most 
Anglo-American studies and what Huey himself calls “the tendency 
among some scholars to resist discussing religion in relation to 
Japanese poetry.” Wary on this score, he then makes concessions that 
have the effect of making his own view sound confused. For instance:
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. . . after all, no one nowadays would suggest that a person 
must have some knowledge of Buddhism to understand or 
appreciate Tamekane’s poetry (although Tamekane himself 
might have held such a view.) [p. 74]
To this he adds the by-now hackneyed point about Westerners’ ten­
dency to assume that “if it is Buddhist, it must be Zen,” comments 
about the necessity of seeing Tamekane as eclectic,12 3 and finally a note 
about the Buddhist basis for the fact that “in the best of Tamekane’s 
poems there is a sense of time suspended, even though his superficial 
materials focus on the flux wrought by time.” (p. 75)
12 Especially valuable for its depth of analysis and balance is Paul Ricoeur, Lectures 
on Ideology and Utopia, ed. by George H. Taylor (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986).
” In fact, however, in her superb study of Tamekane, Iwasa Miyoko has shown that 
what mattered to this poet and his aesthetic was not a generalized “eclecticism” but, 
rather, a concentrated devotion to the texts and practices associated with the yuishiki 
[p£jft] tradition in Buddhism. She devotes the initial seventy pages of her KyOgokuha 
Waka no KenkyQ (Tokyo: Kasama shoin, 1987), explicating this in detail. Huey refers 
to this work as one which, for reasons of time, he could not consult adequately before 
completing his own (p. 168).
14 Japanese scholarship has for some time now been paying much more attention to 
the intellectual dimension (shisO) in literature. See references in my “Zen and the Art 
of Dealing with Zen and the [Literary] Arts,” Journal of Japanese Studies 11:1 
(Winter 1985), pp. 152-169.
I here call attention to this not so much to make a case for the impor­
tance of Buddhism in this literature as to suggest that one of the 
reasons that Japanese poetry strikes Western readers—and especially 
students of comparative literature—as “slight” or “superficial” is that 
our long standing scholarly preoccupation with technique and the 
workings of conventions has made it so. Certainly Huey is correct in 
noting a scholarly animus against considerations of religion. More pre­
cisely and more broadly, however, it has actually been a discomfort 
with any suggestion that ideas could ever have mattered to some of the 
best poets of medieval Japan.14
Although there is much farther to go, Huey has started to tug on this 
important skein in the tradition. There are clear connections between 
the practice of poetry and what was actually an intellectual project 
underway in this era, one running through the various aesthetic 
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treatises and their sophisticated discussions of the relations among 
mind (kokoro), verbalization (kotoba), and whole configuration (su- 
gat a). And for some of these poets—especially, Shunzei, Teika, and Ta­
mekane—Buddhist meditative practices, experiments of an epistemic 
type [“cleansing the organs of perception”, etc.], nature as perceived, 
and the structuring of aesthetic forms were all interconnected.
Once our studies begin to explore this more rigorously there will be a 
benefit that accrues to the overall appreciation of Japanese verse. And 
this will, in turn, assist non-specialists to see that waka in fact is more 
than an almost endless proliferation of merely pretty poems.
Surely the world of the court poets was a hothouse one. Both it and 
the process of anthologizing had certain deleterious consequences— 
things that show up, for instance, in the petty kind of person Tame­
kane became and in limitations on the range of literary expression. 
However, while not dulling the edge of the critique of the ideology 
behind all this, attention also to the kinds of things discussed above 
can demonstrate that there was a lot going on in the literature of this 
period. And the exploration of these aspects of the poetry should show 
that the story of this literature may not be reduced to politics alone. 
That is, there was more here than a tradition of vacuous verse, the 
very “purity” of which was intended to be a justificatory veneer over 
the ugliness of the lives and machinations of the people in power.
There are two senses in which the critique of ideology has an edge. 
Surely it is sharp and can cut deeply to expose some things that badly 
need to be seen. But it also has an edge in the sense of a limitation. 
Although it can tell us about the subtly disguised political and social 
agendas in our literature, arts, religion, and philosophies, it cannot 
prove that those agendas exhaust the meaning and value of that in 
which they are lodged. Although he sees largely positive results having 
come from what he has called the the modern world’s “hermeneutics of 
suspicion,” Paul Ricoeur rightly rejects the tendency towards reduc- 
tionism often found in such styles of interpretation. In his Lectures 
on Ideology and Utopia he writes:
... we recognize that the great works of literature and other 
disciplines are not merely expressions of their times. What 
makes them great is their capacity to be decontextualized 
and recontextualized in new settings. The difference between 
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something which is purely an ideology reflecting one par­
ticular time and something which opens outward to new times 
is that the latter does not merely mirror what presently exists. 
A great part of our culture is nourished by projective ideas 
which are not only expressions, or even concealed expres­
sions, of the times in which they were set forth.15
IS Ricoeur, op. ciL, p. 313.
To be “nourished” by the likes of a DOgen and Tamekane involves 
that we allow their writings to have their own “edge”—that is, some­
thing that gets under us and our own common assumptions. The risk 
works both ways.
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